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Abstract
Social movements have the potential to effect change in firm decision-making. In this paper, we
examine whether the #MeToo movement, spurred by the Harvey Weinstein scandal, led to changes in the
likelihood of Hollywood producers working with female writers on new movie projects. Since #MeToo
affected the entire industry, we use variation in whether producers had past collaborations with Weinstein
to investigate whether and how #MeToo may spur change. We find that producers previously associated
with Weinstein are, on average, about 35-percent more likely to work with female writers after the scandal
than they were before, relative to non-associated producers; and the size of this effect increases with
the intensity of the association. Female producers are the main drivers of our results, which may be
because they are more likely than male producers to be sympathetic to the movement’s cause and face
relatively low costs of enacting change. Changes made by other groups, such as production teams with
the most intense association with Weinstein and less-experienced all-male teams, may be better explained
by motivations to mitigate risk or guilt. We also find that producers do not sacrifice writer experience by
hiring more female writers and that both experienced and novice female writers have benefited from the
increased demand. Our study shows that social movements that seek to address gender inequality can,
indeed, lead to meaningful change. It also provides perspective for thinking about whether, and to what
extent, changes may occur in broader settings.
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1 Introduction
The gender gap has narrowed in many sectors of the economy. While women accounted for one third of
the U.S. labor force in the 1950s, they accounted for 46 percent in 2019.1 Female representation has also
made progress in many high-paying professional fields—e.g., it is about 50 percent in law and medicine and
44 percent in consulting. However, contrary to this trend, the gender gap in high-growth entrepreneurship,
creative industries, and leadership positions has remained large and remarkably persistent. For example,
Gompers and Wang (2017a) show that the percentage of female founders of VC-backed startups rose from
7.2 percent in the early 1990s to only about 10.7 percent after 2010. Similarly, female representation in
the film industry has consistently been low, with women making up only 4.5 percent of directors and 14.4
percent of writers for top-grossing films (Smith et al., 2020). Among Fortune 500 companies, only 22 CEOs
are female, and only 16.5 percent of top-five leadership positions are held by women.2
Such a large gender gap is concerning for a number of reasons. In particular, it may reflect gender-
based frictions that prevent high-quality ideas from being funded and high-quality talent from being hired
or promoted. Indeed, some of the commonly cited reasons for gender gaps in the above settings reflect
systemic and entrenched biases that seem difficult to overcome (e.g., Gompers and Wang, 2017a; Fernandez-
Mateo and Kaplan, 2018; Guzman and Kacperczyk, 2019). For instance, a shared feature of these settings
is that gatekeepers are important and that they are predominantly male (Gompers and Wang, 2017a). For
a variety of reasons, they tend to hire, invest in, or socialize with people who share similar characteristics
and backgrounds (Ibarra, 1993; Botelho and Abraham, 2017). In addition, there may be the (mis)perception
that women are poor fits for positions, activities, or product categories that are commonly associated with
men or are of higher financial risk (Ding et al., 2012; Kacperczyk and Younkin, 2019), and this perception is
difficult to change despite increasing evidence to the contrary (Gompers and Wang, 2017b). Moreover, even
if individual decision makers (e.g., early investors) are not biased against women, the need to coordinate with
the evaluation criteria of relevant others (e.g., later investors) often leads to conventional choices based on
gender or status (Correll et al., 2017; Abraham, 2020).
In this paper, we examine the impact of the #MeToo movement—spurred by the 2017 reporting of sexual-
abuse allegations against Harvey Weinstein—on the gender gap in the context of Hollywood. Social move-
ments, by mobilizing broad alliances of people who are connected through their shared interests, have the
potential to counteract the systemic biases and frictions underlying social issues and bring about change
(e.g., Amenta et al., 2010; Ingram et al., 2010; McDonnell et al., 2015). We expect #MeToo, in particular, to




ing #MeToo—sexual harassment and assault—are especially salient. Importantly, #MeToo has also led to a
broader discussion of the root causes of sexual misconduct, which arguably stems from the persistent gender
gap, both in representation and in power (Dobbin and Kalev, 2017). Second, #MeToo was aided by digital
and social media, which not only led to a wide dissemination of the scandal in a short time, but also encour-
aged many individuals to participate by sharing their stories.3 Since actress Alyssa Milano asked women who
have been sexually harassed or assaulted to write #MeToo after the Weinstein scandal was revealed, over 1.7
million tweets from 85 countries included the hashtag within the first week, and by September 30, 2018,
#MeToo had been tweeted more than 19 million times (Pew Research Center). Within 24 hours, Facebook
reported that 45 percent of its users in the U.S. are friends with someone who has posted a “#Me Too” status;
reports of sexual crimes increased significantly after the scandal (Levy and Mattsson, 2019); and at least 200
prominent men in the U.S. lost their jobs after public allegations of sexual harassment.4 Taken together, the
likelihood of exposure of sexual harassment and gender discrimination has credibly increased after #MeToo.
We focus on the movement’s impact in Hollywood—in particular, on producers’ decision of whether to
work with female writers on their new projects—for several reasons. First, while it is difficult to find a control
sector that has not been exposed to the movement, the Hollywood context allows us to exploit variation in
whether producers had past collaborations with Weinstein to investigate whether and how #MeToo may spur
change. Second, this industry also provides a valuable setting in which there are more opportunities to
change (as producers start new projects), and in which the changes involve high-stakes financial decisions
(each producer manages only a couple of projects at a time, and if a project goes into production, the median
budget is about $25 million). Third, for half of the sample, writers are the content creators and rights owners.
These situations go beyond seeking employment and resemble ones in which entrepreneurs look for venture
investment in a market for ideas (Luo, 2014). Producers resemble managers, in that they are responsible for
attracting talent and obtaining financing from later investors. Thus, this setting may provide lessons that are
potentially generalizable to other managerial and entrepreneurial settings.
Conceptually, the Weinstein scandal and #MeToo may have increased producers’ incentive to work with
female writers for several reasons. They may want to mitigate risk both for the focal project and for their long-
run reputation; to act upon intrinsic motivation stemming from sympathy or guilt; and to take advantage of a
changing industry environment. While the above changes are likely to affect producers in general, we expect
the impact to be greater for those who collaborated with Weinstein in the past (hereafter Weinstein-associated
producers or associated producers), primarily for the first two reasons. Weinstein-associated producers may
3While the phrase “Me Too” was first invoked in this context in 2006 by Tarana Burke, it did not become viral until the addition
of the # in 2017.
4“#MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women,” October 23, 2018, The New
York Times.
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have greater incentives to mitigate risk because they received especially intense media and public scrutiny
after the scandal, and the market may judge them as more likely to share Weinstein’s traits or to have a
higher tolerance for sexual misconduct compared to non-associated producers (Adut, 2005; Pontikes et al.,
2010). Separately, Weinstein-associated producers may also be more intrinsically motivated to concede to the
movement’s demands because they are more likely to be aware of and feel responsible for the abusive culture.
In addition, the association with Weinstein may prompt them to pay more attention to issues highlighted by
#MeToo and, consequently, become more sympathetic to the movement’s cause (e.g., McCarthy and Zald,
1977; Tarrow, 1998; Haidt, 2003).
To examine the movement’s impact, we construct a dataset of 4,188 projects begun between January
2014 and September 2019. We find that relative to non-associated producers, associated producers were 30-
percent more likely to work with female writers on their new projects after the scandal than before, and the
size of this effect increased with the intensity of the association. The effect is not driven by any differential
pre-trends between these two groups of producers and takes about two quarters to realize. The results are also
robust to controlling for their quality differences and potential changes in their composition after the shock.
The differential response by associated producers disappears by the end of our sample, but the convergence
seems to be partially driven by the non-associated producers’ catching up.
We explore the heterogeneity in the Weinstein-association effect and examine potential changes by dif-
ferent subgroups among non-associated producers. We find that female producers, including those who are
associated with Weinstein regardless of experience level and those who are experienced and non-associated,
are the main drivers of our results. This suggests that the most important mechanisms underlying the change
seem to be that #MeToo appeals to a group of decision makers who are more likely to be sympathetic to the
cause and face relatively low costs of enacting change (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Ely, 1994; Tarrow, 1998).
There is also evidence suggesting that risk and/or guilt mitigation may be important in effecting change
for producers who have the most intense association with Weinstein and for the less-experienced all-male
production teams (Barnett and King, 2008; Galasso and Luo, 2020).
Despite the fact that female writers are, on average, much less experienced than male writers, we do not
find a significant decline in the writer’s experience on projects by associated producers after the shock or any
changes in average team size. This suggests that the producers are replacing male writers with female writers
of similar experience levels, rather than expanding the writing team with a “token woman.” In addition, the
increased demand for female writers appears to have benefited both the most experienced writers as well
as relatively novice writers. Finally, we find that associated producers are also more likely to hire female
directors, which is deemed to be a more costly role to fill. Combined with the fact that non-associated
producers have also increased their likelihood of working with female writers by the end of our sample
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period, this is suggestive of wider and longer-term effects of #MeToo on the industry overall.
Taken together, our paper shows that social movements can have a meaningful impact on the gender
gap in a major creative industry through firms’ high-stakes project-selection decisions. We show that the
magnitude of the change varies according to the incentives for and costs of initiating change. Beyond the
movie industry, a wide variety of industries have also started to experience the impacts of #MeToo; and
social movements in general have become an increasingly important force influencing firm decision-making
(e.g., the Black Lives Matter movement). Our results provide a valuable lens through which to think about
whether, and to what extent, changes may occur in these broader settings.
2 Related literature
Our paper contributes to and connects three distinct literatures. First, it relates to work on gender represen-
tation, especially for VC-backed startups (e.g., Gompers and Wang, 2017a; Guzman and Kacperczyk, 2019)
and in organizations more broadly (e.g., Fernandez-Mateo and Kaplan, 2018). Prior work has documented
both supply-side and demand-side reasons for the large gender gap in these settings, such as different types
of experience and opportunities, and discrimination by investors and consumers (e.g., Blanchflower et al.,
2003; Brooks et al., 2014; Abraham, 2020). However, as Jennings and Brush (2013) point out, research on
how these biases might be mitigated is relatively scarce. An increasing number of studies have started to
examine the potential impacts of firm and policy levers on participation, such as training programs (Lyons
and Zhang, 2017, 2018) and access to networks (Howell and Nanda, 2019). Our study highlights the role of
social movements in facilitating investment in female creators.5 Furthermore, we show that sufficient female
presence in positions of power is not only positively correlated with female representation before the shock—
which confirms the prior literature’s findings (e.g., McGinn and Milkman, 2013)—but also facilitates change
through the crisis. In our context, female producers help promote gender equality for both demand-side
reasons (e.g., issues #MeToo highlights resonate more with female producers) and supply-side reasons, as
female writers are more willing to participate, anticipating friendlier work conditions (Fernandez-Mateo and
Kaplan, 2018).
Recent research in sociology and organizational theory has shown that social movements are capable
of influencing corporate behavior and bringing about change (e.g., Ingram et al., 2010; McDonnell et al.,
2015). Studies have found that the effects of social movements are likely to increase with the amount of
(sustained) media attention (King, 2008; McDonnell and King, 2013), saliency of the issues (McDonnell and
Werner, 2016), resources available (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), and society’s receptivity to change (Amenta,
5A related but different force is political ideology, which is shown to have a significant impact on gender inequality (see, for
example, Carnahan and Greenwood (2018) for evidence in organizational settings).
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2006). Our paper contributes to this literature by providing novel evidence that social movements seeking
to address workplace inequality can lead to significant changes. We highlight that social movements may
lead to change via the association with the perpetrator of the scandal that spurred the movement. Such a
mechanism is important, as it significantly expands the impact of the movement to parties beyond the direct
targets (Yue et al., 2013). Lastly, as mentioned above, our study identifies important facilitators of change
(i.e., presence of women in power positions). This complements prior findings in this literature that decision
makers who are sympathetic to a movement’s cause are crucial allies for realizing change (McCarthy and
Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 1998; Briscoe et al., 2014; McDonnell and Cobb, 2019).
Finally, our paper relates to studies on the spillover effect of scandals or negative events (e.g., Adut, 2005;
Devers et al., 2009). Spillover may happen through network ties (Jensen, 2006; Pontikes et al., 2010) or by
similarities in terms of industry, product characteristics, or organizational forms (Jonsson et al., 2009; Vergne,
2012). Much of the prior literature focuses on the performance impacts on the associated parties due to third
parties’ actions (e.g., customers refrain from buying goods). Our paper shows that the associated firms may
respond with changes in line with societal demands. To this end, our paper highlights novel mechanisms
that connect the scandal literature to studies of social movements. The scandal literature typically finds that
associated parties, subjected to negative inferences, make changes to mitigate legal, market, and reputational
risk (Barnett and King, 2008; Galasso and Luo, 2020). In our setting, this would imply a greater response
by all-male production teams, as they are more likely to be perceived as sharing Weinstein’s negative traits.
In contrast, we find female producers to be the primary driver of change. This suggests that scandal can
instigate social change through channels beyond risk mitigation.
3 Background
3.1 Movie production in Hollywood
Making a movie is a long, costly, and uncertain process. Producers—often partners or executives of pro-
duction companies and studios—are the managers of this process. They source projects by either acquiring
finished scripts from screenwriters or by acquiring the adaptation rights to pre-existing works (e.g., a novel)
and hiring writers to adapt them into scripts. With a project in place, producers are tasked with hiring direc-
tors and assembling cast and crew, and, importantly, securing financing. Often, the agency that represents
the writer may leverage its client portfolio and attach key acting and/or directing talent to a project from the
beginning (a practice called ‘packaging’). The most important financiers are movie studios (e.g., Warner
Bros.). Projects developed by studio-affiliated production companies, often more-established ones, require
the studio’s budget approval before going into production; and projects developed by independent production
companies often need to partner with a movie studio later in the process to finance, distribute, and market the
6
movie. Luo et al. (2020) show that about 16 percent of the projects are eventually produced and theatrically
released; for released movies, the median time from start to release is 2.1 years, and the median production
budget is about $25 million.
As noted earlier, female representation in Hollywood has traditionally been low in virtually every content-
related position (Smith et al., 2020). We focus on writers for three reasons. First, scripts are the basis
of movie projects, and writers are either the original creators or have major input in adapting screenplays.
Second, the choice of the writer (and his/her gender), to a great extent, influences or correlates with later
choices—including the hiring of a director and actors/actresses—and signals the type of working environ-
ment the producers want to create. Third, also because writers are crucial at the start of a project, they are
systematically captured in our data for early-stage projects. In contrast, director information is available for
only half of our sample projects. Data on acting talent are similarly incomplete; moreover, there is limited
variation in whether or not a project includes an actress, and more-precise measures such as their share of
speaking time are not systematically available for early projects.
3.2 The Harvey Weinstein scandal and the #MeToo movement
On October 5 and 15, 2017, The New York Times and The New Yorker, respectively, published two articles
detailing allegations of decades of sexual harassment against Harvey Weinstein, including three accusations
of rape.6 Since those two reports, more than 100 women have accused Weinstein of sexual harassment,
assault, or rape, ranging from the 1980s to 2015.7 On October 15, 2017, actor and activist Alyssa Milano
sent a tweet encouraging people to share their stories of harassment or assault by replying “me too” on social
media. As mentioned earlier, her original tweet led to a surge of responses on various social media platforms
and subsequently uncovered a large number of sexual misconduct cases in Hollywood and beyond.
Individuals that have worked with Weinstein in the past were some of the first people targeted by the
media to respond, suggesting that Weinstein-associated individuals received especially heightened attention
after the scandal.8 While some claimed that they were unaware of these allegations, many have since ac-
knowledged knowing about Weinstein’s transgressions to various extents.9 This suggests that, while the
6“Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades,” by Jodi Kantor and Megan Twohey, October 5, 2017,
The New York Times. “From aggressive overtures to sexual assault: Harvey Weinstein’s accusers tell their stories,” by Ronan Farrow,
October 10, 2017, The New Yorker.
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey Weinstein sexual abuse cases#cite note-32.
8Source: https://www.theguardian.com/film/2017/oct/09/harvey-weinstein-hollywood-men-actors-directors#img-1
9E.g., Meryl Streep claimed,“Not everybody knew. [...] I didn’t know about these other offenses: I did not know about his
financial settlements with actresses and colleagues; I did not know about his having meetings in his hotel room, his bathroom,
or other inappropriate, coercive acts.” Actress Rose McGowan claimed that when she told actor Ben Affleck about an incident
with Weinstein, his response was, “God damn it, I told him to stop doing this.” Quentin Tarantino, a long-time collaborator of
Weinstein’s, said “I knew enough to have done something about it. There was more to it than just the normal rumors, the normal
gossip. It wasn’t secondhand. I knew he did a couple of these things.” Source: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/meryl-streep-harvey-
weinstein n 59db5d87e4b072637c45420e; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/movies/tarantino-weinstein.html
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allegations against Weinstein may have been news to some, it was known in Hollywood to different degrees,
particularly by individuals who had worked with Weinstein in the past.
The scandal and #MeToo were seen as a call for action in Hollywood. For instance, the Producers’ Guild
of America has created codes of conduct for producers and executives to refrain from holding professional
meetings in ‘high-risk locations.’ Beyond preventing harassment, #MeToo appears to have led to a broader
focus on female representation and their lack of opportunities. Major studios, film festivals, and celebrities
have pledged varying commitments to promote gender parity.10 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the demand
for female talent seems to have increased since the Weinstein scandal.11
4 Conceptual Framework
We begin with a conceptual discussion that helps shed light on possible impacts of the Weinstein scandal
and #MeToo and motivates our empirical strategy. In particular, we focus on how these events may have
increased producers’ incentives to work with female writers relative to male writers, which is in line with
the movement’s demands. Given the wide-reaching impact of #MeToo, our discussion is not intended to
be exhaustive. Rather, we aim to capture mechanisms that are likely to be first-order by building on our
understanding of the industry context and existing findings in the literature. In the following, we first discuss
how the scandal and #MeToo likely affected Hollywood producers in general; we then explain why we expect
the impact to be greater for producers who have collaborated with Weinstein on past projects.
4.1 What changed after the Weinstein scandal and #MeToo?
From the perspective of a producer, who is the decision maker at the time of setting up a project, the Weinstein
scandal and #MeToo may have increased his/her incentive to work with female writers for three reasons: 1)
to mitigate risk (both for the focal project and for the producer’s long-run reputation); 2) to act upon intrinsic
motivations stemming from sympathy or guilt; and 3) to take advantage of favorable opportunities that arise
from a changing industry environment.
Risk mitigation. An important consequence of #MeToo is that the expected costs (legal, market, and
reputational) associated with harassment-related issues have credibly increased. For any actual incidents,
evidence suggests that #MeToo has significantly increased the likelihood of exposure (Levy and Mattsson,
2019). In addition, various stakeholders are also more likely to penalize projects known to, or perceived to,
have more of these abusive issues. By exposing the misconduct that took place behind the scenes, #MeToo
likely has lowered consumers’—especially more socially conscious ones’—willingness to pay for movies
10https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/movies/inclusion-rider.html.
11E.g., Salma Hayek said that her company had been struggling to find female writers and directors because they are all booked.
Source: https://apnews.com/20d161014e3c46dfa5dea469b14f34e1/A-year-after-Weinstein,-Hollywood-is-still-soul-searching.
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made under abusive working conditions. Critical industry stakeholders, such as acting and directing talent
and studio executives, are also less likely to collaborate or to invest in such projects, both to avoid consumer
sanction and potential legal hassles and to protect their own reputation (Lins et al., 2019).
After #MeToo, working exclusively with male writers risks greater scrutiny from the media, a higher risk
of losing consumers, and greater difficulty in attracting talent and financing. In contrast, working with female
writers helps mitigate such risks. First, such a choice may lower the probability of harassment—against
anyone working on the project and potentially by anyone—for the focal project. Research suggests that a
greater presence of women tends to promote more respectful work environments, where harassment is less
likely to flourish and vulnerable parties are more comfortable reporting it (Dobbin and Kalev, 2017). Projects
by female writers might be more attractive to other female talent; and the presence of female writers may
also help signal the producer’s commitment to creating a better work culture and norms, thereby lowering the
costs of recruiting other women. Second, working with female writers may also help mitigate media scrutiny
and nurture (or restore) the producer’s reputation, which is beneficial in the long run.
Intrinsic motivations. Producers may also be more intrinsically motivated to improve female represen-
tation in this industry after the scandal and #MeToo. As discussed, these events have brought to the forefront
not only problems of sexual harassment and assault, which are obvious violations of law and moral rules, but
also issues of gender disparity in representation, pay, and power. The increased awareness and saliency of
these issues may have triggered what social psychologists call “moral emotions” such as guilt and sympathy
in the producers and motivated them to make pro-social changes, including providing women with more
opportunities (e.g., Haidt, 2003).12 These motivations are intrinsic, in that producers make changes not to
mitigate risk, manage their reputation, or address other cost-benefit considerations, but because the producers
are genuinely convinced by the movement’s calls to change.
Producers, among the gatekeepers of this industry, might be more inclined to feel partly responsible
for the problematic culture exposed by #MeToo. While some may be guilty of actual wrong doings, many
might feel the guilt of not having done enough (i.e., the “guilt of passivity” Jaspers (1947)). Alternatively,
#MeToo may make producers more aware of and, consequently, more sympathetic to the mistreatment,
biases, and barriers women face in the workplace. Though distinct, both emotions allow individuals to
take the perspective of women and feel motivated to make changes either to compensate or to help (e.g.,
Eisenberg, 2000). An important distinction of sympathy—contrasting guilt and the risk-mitigation incentive
discussed above—is that it potentially motivates individuals beyond those who are directly responsible for
the problematic culture. As identified by the social movement literature, sympathetic allies, especially those
12See Goodwin et al. (2001) for a discussion about the importance of emotions in social movements and how emotions relate to
many of the key social movement concepts.
9
who control resources and decision power, play a significant role in realizing reforms (McCarthy and Zald,
1977; McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1998).
Favorable opportunities. Apart from direct impacts, #MeToo may also indirectly affect a producer’s
decision-making by influencing relevant stakeholders. For some of the same reasons discussed above, con-
sumers, talent, and studio executives appear to have increased their demand for projects involving female
talent. Notably, as discussed in Section 3.2, major studios have made various commitments to promote gen-
der parity. Because the engagement of these parties is critical to a project’s success, their increased demand
for female talent shifts the economic cost-benefit considerations in favor of projects by female writers, even
if the producer him/herself does not need to mitigate risk or is not intrinsically motivated to change.
Of course, whether and to what extent we will see change will also depend on how costly it is to change.
A number of factors affect the actual and the opportunity costs of working with female writers, including
the quantity and quality of the supply of female writers and their ideas; the search and evaluation costs; the
amount of resources a producer is able to mobilize (e.g., McCarthy and Zald, 1977); and, if necessary, the
costs of improving the working conditions. Generally, the greater the costs of identifying, recruiting, and
working with female writers, the more limited the change will be.
4.2 The Association with Weinstein
While the shock is likely to affect Hollywood producers in general, we expect the impact to be greater for
producers who have collaborated with Weinstein in the past. In particular, the association with Weinstein is
likely to lead to a greater incentive to mitigate risk and more-heightened intrinsic motivations to change. We
do not expect the third mechanism—opportunities that arise from a more favorable industry environment—to
work differentially solely due to the association.13
We expect the incentive to mitigate risk to be greater for Weinstein-associated producers for two reasons.
First, as explained in Section 3.2, after the shock, associated producers received significantly greater media
attention than non-associated producers did. This heightened scrutiny implies a greater likelihood of expo-
sure of any potential harassment or discrimination incidences for associated producers. Second, associated
producers are also more likely than non-associated producers to (or be perceived to) share similar traits with
Weinstein or to have a higher tolerance for misconduct in the workplace. Research in economics and soci-
ology has consistently shown that people with similar traits are more likely to attract and to influence each
other (e.g., McPherson et al., 2001). Because information about a producer’s past behavior and true attitudes
towards women is incomplete, even a ‘mere association’ may lead to a negative inference and adversely
13Note that, as we show later, Weinstein-associated producers are more successful and have higher status than non-associated
producers, which may make them more capable of taking advantage of such opportunities. Here, we consider why past collaborations
with Weinstein may lead to a differential increase in the incentive to work with female writers, holding the quality aspects of the
producers constant. We address such a selection effect empirically in the paper (see Section 5.2).
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affect the producer’s reputation (Adut, 2005; Jensen, 2006; Devers et al., 2009; Pontikes et al., 2010).
We also expect associated producers to be more intrinsically motivated than non-associated producers to
concede to the movement’s demands. As discussed in Section 3.2, people who have worked with Weinstein
are more likely to be aware of his behavior and the widespread abusive culture or even to be complicit in
such behavior themselves, both of which are likely to lead to a greater level of guilt. It is also possible that,
without necessarily feeling guiltier, associated producers are more likely than non-associated producers to
pay more attention to these issues and, consequently, become more cognizant of and more sympathetic to
the movement’s cause (Dickert and Slovic, 2009).
The above discussion motivates our main empirical strategy of comparing Weinstein-associated produc-
ers with non-associated producers. In particular, we hypothesize that after the shock, the increase in the
likelihood of working with female writers will be greater for Weinstein-associated producers than for non-
associated producers. To be precise, non-associated producers help to control for: (i) any industry-level
impacts of #MeToo that affect associated versus non-associated producers similarly; and (ii) other confound-
ing factors that are unrelated to the scandal or #MeToo but may have separately encouraged greater female
participation in the industry around the same time.
It is certainly possible that after the shock, the negative reputational impact due to the association in-
creased the cost of recruiting female writers, but this effect will work against us finding a differentially
positive change for associated producers. Finally, as discussed above, a differential impact via the Weinstein
association may be due to multiple possible mechanisms. However, the relative importance of each mecha-
nism and the cost of recruiting female writers will likely vary for different types of producers. In addition
to the average Weinstein-association effect, we will also explore the heterogeneity of this effect and how
changes after #MeToo may vary across subgroups of non-associated producers. These additional results,
though short of precisely pinning down a specific mechanism, help sharpen our interpretation of the changes
we observe.
5 Data and Empirical Specification
5.1 Data
Our primary data source is Done Deal Pro (DDP), an internet database that tracks script transactions—
both acquisitions of original screenplays and adaptation contracts—on a daily basis. DDP is recognized
by various industry organizations (e.g., the Writers Guild of America) as one of the leading movie project
information sources. We also use the Internet Movie Database (IMDb), the most comprehensive publicly
available database containing information on movies, casts, and crews, to obtain information on a person’s
industry experience and past collaborations with Weinstein.
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Our sample period starts in January 2014 and ends in September 2019. To the best of our knowledge,
the DDP records provide the earliest systematic (and publicly available) measure of the start of a movie
project.14 The DDP database contains 4,836 records during this period. We drop 572 observations that have
no information about the writers or producers. We also drop 76 observations by the Weinstein company or by
producers who subsequently faced allegations of sexual harassment themselves after #MeToo.15 The sample
has a total of 4,188 observations after these exclusions.
Our main outcome variable is whether the writers of a project include at least one female. The majority of
the observations (76.6 percent) involve a single writer; 20.9 percent consist of two writers; and the remaining
2.5 percent have three or more writers. For each writer, we use the software genderize.io to predict gender
based on the person’s first name. If the confidence level is below 95%, we manually confirm the writer’s
gender using additional sources. 23.5 percent of the 3,728 unique writers are female, and 25.5 percent of our
sample projects include at least one female writer.
As explained above, our main empirical strategy exploits the differential responses of associated versus
non-associated producers following the shock. We define a Weinstein association based on whether the
producers of a project had (observable) collaborations with Weinstein before the shock. The DDP records
identify one producer for 19.0 percent of the projects; two to four producers for 57.3 percent of the projects;
and five or more for the remaining 23.7 percent. For each individual producer, we identify the number of
‘joint movies’—movies for which this focal producer was credited for any of the four major roles (producing,
directing, acting, and writing) and for which Weinstein was credited as a producer—that were released at any
time before the shock. Twelve percent of the 5,430 unique producers had past collaborations. We then define
a Weinstein association (at the project level) as indicating whether at least one of the producers had a joint
movie with Weinstein before the shock. Close to half (43 percent) of our sample projects were managed by
production teams with a Weinstein association.
We explore the heterogeneity in the Weinstein-association effect along a number of dimensions, one of
which is the gender composition of the production team. We identify the gender of each producer in much
the same way that we identify writers and find that 25.7 percent of the 5,430 unique producers are female,
and 50.4 percent of our sample projects have at least one female producer.
Another dimension of heterogeneity that we explore is the producers’ experience level. Our main mea-
sure is the number of producing credits that a producer obtained in the previous ten years for movies dis-
14Our data, thus, include producers who are on board with a project early on and are less likely to capture the scenario in which a
Weinstein-associated producer may elbow his/her way into a late-stage project with female writers.
15Vox compiles a list of people who have been accused of sexual misconduct since April 2017 (https://www.vox.com/a/sexual-
harassment-assault-allegations-list). We found 17 unique producers in our sample on this list. By excluding these people and the
Weinstein company itself, we isolate producers for which the negative publicity and potential litigations may be too disruptive for
them to implement the changes we study in this paper (e.g., the Weinstein company filed for bankruptcy).
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tributed by the top-30 movie studios; and the maximum is taken for production teams with multiple pro-
ducers. Producers with zero past (major) credits managed 12.92 percent of the projects, and the median is
six credits. We also construct three other variables to capture a producer’s quality and industry status: the
number of Best Picture Academy Awards (the Oscars) a producer had won or been nominated for, and the
likelihood of working with major studios and the largest agencies on past projects (as captured by the DDP
database since 2004). Again, the maximum is taken for production teams with multiple producers.
We construct a measure of writer experience as the number of writing credits a writer obtained in the
previous ten years for movies distributed by the top-30 movie studios, with the maximum taken for teams
with multiple writers. The majority of the projects (62.0 percent) are by writing teams with zero past major
writing credits. We include this variable as a control in regressions on the likelihood of having at least one
female writer. Additionally, we explore whether the shock had an impact on the experience level of the
writing team. For this analysis, writer experience becomes the dependent variable.
Table 1a provides a summary of the variables by Weinstein association. The summary shows that
Weinstein-associated producers are significantly more experienced; have won or been nominated for more
awards; are more likely to work with the top-30 movie studios and the largest talent agencies on past projects;
are less likely to include female producers; and work in larger teams. Please see the table notes for the defi-
nitions of other control variables. Table A1 in the appendix provides a correlation table.
5.2 Empirical specification
Figure 1a provides a first look at our main result. It plots the likelihood of having at least one female
writer for projects set up in a given quarter by Weinstein-associated production teams and for non-associated
teams. The vertical line indicates the quarter before the scandal. For non-associated producers, the likelihood
stays relatively stable before and for many quarters after the shock. For associated producers, this likelihood
appears to follow a trend similar to that for non-associated producers, but it experiences a sharp jump starting
in the third quarter after the scandal. On average, this likelihood increased by 3.6 percentage points for non-
associated producers (from 0.251 to 0.287, p-value is 0.081), whereas it increased by 11.1 percentage points
for associated producers (from 0.219 to 0.331, p-value is 0.000).
To put the above comparison into a regression framework, we estimate the following difference-in-
differences (DID) style regressions:
Yi = α+δWeinstein associationi×Post shockt + γWeinstein associationi + yt +βXi + εi, (1)
where Yi equals one if project i has at least one female writer; Post shockt equals one for the time period
after (and including) the fourth quarter of 2017; Weinstein associationi indicates whether any producer on
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the production team had collaborations with Weinstein before the shock; Xi are control variables, and yt
are quarterly fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the studio level.16 As discussed in Section 4.2,
non-associated producers help to control for any industry-level changes in response to #MeToo and any
confounding factors unrelated to the shock. Under the parallel-trend assumption, δ captures the effect of the
scandal and #MeToo via the association with Weinstein.
Potential concerns of anticipation effects are, to a large extent, mitigated by the following observations.
First, Figure A1 shows that Google search interests experienced a sharp and immediate increase in the week
of October 8, 2017 (the week after the The New York Times’s reporting) for the keywords Harvey Weinstein
and Me Too movement. This suggests that the public, at least, did not anticipate the reporting and #MeToo.
Second, a vast majority of the ties were formed long before the reporting of the scandal. Lastly, as suggested
by Figure 1a and confirmed by a time-specific DID regression that we report later, we do not observe any
pre-trend in the difference between associated and non-associated producers leading up to the shock.
The lack of pre-trend supports our parallel-trend assumption. That said, this assumption may be violated
later in our sample, as producers associated with Weinstein are different from non-associated producers, in
both observable and potentially unobservable ways. As described above, associated producers are signifi-
cantly more experienced and are higher-status than non-associated producers. Thus, one concern is that, as
#MeToo raises the demand for female writers in general, associated producers may be more likely to work
with female writers after #MeToo not because of the association per se, but because they are better able to
attract female writers. The second concern is about endogenous entries or exits. For example, it is possible
that low-quality and more-abusive producers were driven out of the market after #MeToo and that such exits
may have been disproportionately large for Weinstein-associated producers. Then, a positive DID coefficient
estimated from the above equation may reflect a change in the composition of producers, rather than a change
in decision-making by the same person.
We address the first concern (quality as a confounder) in two ways. First, we control for a large number
of observables that may affect both association and outcomes. The inclusion of these controls does not sig-
nificantly change the magnitude or precision of our estimates, while generating a relatively large increase in
R-squared. This suggests that omitted variables are unlikely to be severe in this setting (Oster, 2019). Sec-
ond, we examine whether our results are robust to matched samples for which the two groups are statistically
similar in observable characteristics.17
16Our results are robust to other methods of estimating standard errors, such as robust standard errors and two-way clustering at
the studio and the year level.
17Matching samples are generated by the coarsened exact matching method (Iacus et al., 2012). At the project level, the matching
is based on the characteristics of the production teams—Producer experience, Prior awards, Producer experience with major studios,
Producer experience with top agencies, Include female producers, and Producer team size—and Post-shock. Table 1b shows that
the two groups of projects are well-balanced along these characteristics and most of the other variables, as well. As explained in
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We address concerns of endogenous entries or exits via two sets of producer-level analyses: one at the
producer-project level and the other with a balanced panel dataset at the producer-quarterly level. These
analyses allow us to control for producer fixed effects, which is difficult to do in a project-level sample
because a producer may work with different teams for different projects. The inclusion of producer fixed
effects mitigates the concern that the effect is driven by changes in the composition of producers because
the identification comes from variation within the same producer before and after the shock. An important
downside of these specifications, however, is that a producer’s decision is correlated with that of his/her
production team; and, relatedly, some of the producers in the control group will be ‘contaminated’ due to
their team members’ association with Weinstein.
Finally, because all producers compete for the same pool of scripts and female writers, it is possible that
part of the differential response is due to a competition effect, whereby associated producers compete female
writers away from non-associated producers. This suggests that the increase in female writers’ participation
in projects by Weinstein-associated producers, estimated from equation (1), may overestimate the absolute
increase relative to the counterfactual scenario without the shock.
6 Results
6.1 Average effect of Weinstein association
Table 2 presents the regression results as specified in equation (1). Column 1 includes the basic DID vari-
ables without additional controls; Column 2 includes the full set of controls. The DID coefficient that we
are interested in is consistent across different specifications, in terms of both economic and statistical signifi-
cance. Relative to projects by non-associated producers, projects by associated producers are 8.9 percentage
points more likely to have at least one female writer after the shock than before (Column 2). Assuming the
same difference between these two groups of projects before and after the shock, this increase represents a
35-percent increase relative to the counterfactual level without the scandal.18
Figure 1b plots the quarter-specific DID coefficients. Before the shock, the estimated difference in the
likelihood of including female writers between these two groups of projects are not statistically different
from that for the baseline quarter (the quarter before the scandal). Starting from the second quarter of 2018,
the DID coefficients become positive and significant, with the largest difference being 20 percentage points.
the next paragraph, we use producer-level regressions for robustness checks. For these regressions, a matched sample is generated
at the producer level based on Producer experience, Prior awards, Producer experience with major studios, and Producer experience
with top agencies. The person-level characteristics are defined based on their resumes before the Weinstein scandal and #MeToo.
Table A2b shows that the two groups of producers are similar in their characteristics in the matched sample.
18Among projects by non-associated producers, the likelihood of a project having at least one female writer is 0.251 before
the shock and 0.287 after the shock, and this likelihood is 0.219 for projects by Weinstein-associated producers before the shock.
Assuming the same difference between the two groups of projects before and after the shock, the counterfactual level for associated
producers after the shock is 0.255.
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The difference becomes smaller and statistically insignificant six quarters after the shock. Judging from the
raw data, this convergence is driven partly by the increase in this likelihood by non-associated producers in
the last two quarters of our sample; in other words, the control group partially catches up.
For reasons discussed in Section 5.2, we provide two sets of robustness checks. First, in Columns 4
and 5 of Table 2, we show that our baseline conclusion is robust to using a matched sample. This mitigates
the concern that quality might be a potential confounder. Second, to address concerns over changes in the
composition of producers, we report regression results that allow us to control for producer fixed effects. Ta-
ble A3 reports results from a producer-project-level analysis. The DID coefficients of different specifications,
including those using matched producers, are all positive and statistically significant. Table A4 reports fixed-
effects Poisson regressions, based on balanced producer-quarterly data, in which the dependent variables are,
respectively, the number of projects, the number of projects that include at least one female writer, and the
number of projects that include no female writers set up by a given producer in a given quarter. Note that the
data are extremely sparse; over 90 percent of the observations have zero projects.19 The first three columns
use all the producers, whereas the last three use the matched producers. Though quantitatively different,
the results from both samples suggest that, relative to non-associated producers, associated producers have
increased the number of projects with female writers relative to projects with only male writers. Moreover,
we do not see a significant negative impact on the quantity of projects due to a Weinstein association. This is
consistent with the idea that associated producers may be able to minimize the negative impact of the scandal
by making changes in line with the demands of the movement.20
The previous analysis treats the Weinstein association as a binary variable. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2
examine Weinstein association at different intensity levels—‘low’ if the total number of past joint movies
with Weinstein among all producers in the team is equal to one (43.89 percent of the treatment group);
‘medium’ if the total number of past joint movies is more than two but less than or equal to six (49.89
percent); and ‘high’ if the total number is more than six (6.23 percent). We find that the increase is the
largest for the small number of producers whose association with Weinstein was the most intense, and this
increase is statistically greater than that for producers with ‘low’ and ‘medium’ associations.21
19We use the Quasi-ML method to compute robust standard errors for the Poisson model, which produces consistent estimates
under relatively weak assumptions, allowing for overdispersion and a large mass point at zero for the dependent variable.
20Note that the impact of the shock on the quantity of projects that associated producers are able to set up is theoretically ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, they have a greater incentive to set up projects including female writers; on the other hand, they may face
greater difficulty attracting talent and investors, in general, due to a negative impact on their reputation. Thus, it is plausible that
they set up fewer projects after the shock, but the percentage of these projects that include female writers increases.
21The results by association intensity are robust to using the total number of past joint movies with Weinstein as a continuous
treatment variable. The DID coefficient is 0.13 (p-value < 0.05) for both the baseline and the matched samples.
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6.2 Heterogeneous effects of Weinstein association and potential mechanisms
The above findings are consistent with the idea that the scandal and #MeToo have increased producers’
incentives to work with female writers, and the increase is particularly strong for those associated with
Weinstein. Given the wide-reaching impact of #MeToo, different (and not mutually exclusive) mechanisms
are likely to be present. In the following, we examine potential heterogeneities in the Weinstein-association
effect and the potential changes by different subgroups among non-associated producers (the control group).
These additional results help shed light on the relative importance of various mechanisms in driving both the
differential change by Weinstein-associated producers and the overall change we observe.
6.2.1 Heterogeneity in Weinstein-association effect by gender composition of production teams
We first explore how the Weinstein-association effect may vary by the gender composition of a production
team. As discussed in Section 4, the differential increase by Weinstein-associated producers may be due to
multiple reasons—in particular, a greater incentive to mitigate risk and a greater intrinsic motivation driven
by sympathy or guilt. While all may be at play, their relative importance is likely to vary by the gender of
the producers. In addition, the cost of change may also be different.
Intuitively, male producers are more likely to be driven by an incentive to mitigate risk or to alleviate
guilt. Male producers may face greater public scrutiny and market risk than female producers because they
are more likely to be perceived as sharing traits with Weinstein or having a higher tolerance for misconduct.
This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that male producers associated with Weinstein may have been
more “in the know” regarding his behavior; the fact that producers who were later accused of misconduct
were almost all male;22 and prior findings in the literature that scandals may have negative spillover effects on
parties sharing similar characteristics or organizational/product categories (e.g., Jonsson et al., 2009; Vergne,
2012). Similarly, male producers may also be more likely to feel guilty about being directly or indirectly
complicit in the problematic culture and are, hence, more intrinsically motivated to change.
In contrast, we expect female producers to be more motivated by a greater degree of sympathy. Research
finds that the strength of sympathy depends on factors such as whether one is in the same state as the victim,
shares similar past experience, and has social proximity (e.g., same racial and gender groups) (Loewenstein
and Small, 2007). Studies of social movements also stress the importance of collective identity, solidarity, and
commonly shared beliefs and ideologies as powerful motivations to participate in and support a movement
(e.g., Briscoe et al., 2014; McDonnell and Cobb, 2019). This suggests that female producers are more likely
than male producers to be sympathetic to the call of #MeToo to empower women.23 In addition, production
22Source: https://www.vox.com/a/sexual-harassment-assault-allegations-list
23Anecdotal evidence suggests that women in positions of power in Hollywood are more likely to push for hiring female talent and
producing more complex female-led stories. Source: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-television-women/after-metoo-hollywood-
17
teams with female producers may face lower costs of identifying and evaluating female writers and their
ideas via their social networks (Ely, 1994). On the supply side, female writers may also be more reluctant
to work with all-male production teams (Fernandez-Mateo and Fernandez, 2016). All-male teams may try
to adjust their work conditions, but such adjustments are costly and may not be effective. Our data show
that before the shock, Weinstein-associated production teams with at least one female producer were almost
twice as likely to work with female writers than were associated teams with all-male producers (0.28 versus
0.14). This contrast is consistent with our above depiction of the differences by gender.
The split-sample results in Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3a show that, despite a much lower prior level
of working with female writers, the Weinstein-association effect for all-male production teams is less than
half that for teams with at least one female producer (5.7 versus 13.4 percentage points). Columns 3 and
4 further restrict the sample to production teams in which there is sufficient female representation; that
is, the two measures—(i) the total experience of all female producers divided by the total experience of
all producers; and (ii) the proportion of female producers relative to the total number of producers—are
above 0.25. The results show that the magnitude of change is economically larger for teams with sufficient
female presence. The result that production teams with female producers are the main driver of the average
Weinstein-association effect suggests that one set of mechanisms—a greater degree of sympathy and a lower
cost of change—seems more important than the incentives to mitigate risk or to alleviate guilt.24
6.2.2 Heterogeneity in Weinstein-association effect by gender composition and producer experience
To sharpen our interpretation, we further break down our sample by producer experience and also consider
changes by various groups among non-associated producers. Table 3b shows that for production teams both
with and without female producers, the Weinstein-association effect is economically larger and statistically
more significant for less-experienced production teams (i.e., the most experienced producer in the team had
six or fewer major producing credits—the median). In contrast, for more-experienced production teams, the
association with Weinstein does not make a significant difference. A closer look at changes by the various
control groups (the bottom two rows of this table) reveals some interesting differences. The reason that we do
not observe a standalone Weinstein-association effect for more-experienced teams with female producers is
that both the control and treatment groups increase their likelihood of working with female writers similarly
(Column 4). The only group among teams with female producers that does not change are less-experienced
non-associated teams (Column 3). In contrast, for production teams with only male producers (Columns 1
women-seize-power-behind-tv-camera-idUSKBN1L1119.
24Unreported results show that the Weinstein-association effect is economically and statistically greater when the female producers
are themselves associated with Weinstein than when the unassociated female producers are only teaming up with male Weinstein-
associated producers. This is consistent with the idea that a woman’s own association with Weinstein may generate greater sympathy
for a female producer than an indirect association through her male colleagues. Separately, but not mutually exclusively, it is also
possible that with male associates of Weinstein on the team, it is more difficult to attract female talent after #MeToo.
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and 2), the only group that significantly changes are the less-experienced teams associated with Weinstein.
The broad changes by production teams with female producers—including those associated with Wein-
stein regardless of experience level and those who are experienced and non-associated—further supports the
idea that the issues that #MeToo highlights resonate with female producers and that they have a cost advan-
tage to initiate change. The finer breakdowns also allow for more-nuanced interpretations. For teams with
female producers, both the extra incentives that arise from being associated with Weinstein and the ability to
mobilize resources seem to be sufficient to incite change by themselves. Non-associated, less-experienced
teams lack both, which could explain their lack of change.25 For experienced production teams, the lack of
a standalone Weinstein-association effect is likely to be driven by the fact that after the shock, the share of
projects with female writers is close to 50 percent for both control and treatment groups. For male production
teams, the differential Weinstein-association effect by experience can be explained by risk mitigation—
experienced producers may be buffered from reputational threat (Flammer, 2012; Sharkey, 2014) either
because their reputation is already established or because they face little difficulty in attracting talent or
financing, even in the absence of change.26
As we discuss in Section 4, another possible reason for producers to hire more female writers is to take
advantage of the more favorable industry environment after #MeToo. Such increased opportunities are likely
to apply to producers generally, regardless of their association with Weinstein. Results on the control groups
(the last two rows in Table 3b) suggest that this factor, though likely present, is not particularly strong, at
least in the short run. Except for non-associated, experienced teams with female producers, none of the other
control groups significantly increased their hiring of female writers.
Taken together, the collective set of results suggests that the most important mechanisms underlying the
change seem to be that #MeToo and the scandal appeal to a group of decision makers—female producers, in
particular—who are sympathetic to the cause and face relatively low costs of enacting change (e.g., McCarthy
and Zald, 1977; Ely, 1994; Tarrow, 1998). There is also evidence suggesting that risk and/or guilt-mitigation
are also likely to be important (Barnett and King, 2008; Galasso and Luo, 2020), which may explain the
large response by the small group of production teams that are most intensely associated with Weinstein
(who are mostly male), and the small but statistically significant change among the less-experienced all-male
production teams.27
25Note that their level of working with female writers was quite high before #MeToo. It seems that not being associated with
Weinstein does not give them the extra incentive to change; or not having sufficient resources makes them less competitive in the
post-shock world in which competition for female writers is high.
26This result is also consistent with less-experienced all-male production teams being more intrinsically motivated. This is possi-
ble if, for example, less-experienced teams are younger and more-convinced by #MeToo’s cause.
27The DID coefficient for the subset of projects by production teams that are most intensely associated with Weinstein is 0.199 (p-
value < 0.001, where the control group is non-associated producers). Sixty-four percent of these projects are by all-male production
teams. When considering these projects only, the DID coefficient is economically larger at 0.230 (p-value < 0.001, the control group
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6.3 Impacts on writer experience
Having shown that producers associated with Weinstein have differentially increased their likelihood of
working with female writers after the shock, an important question is whether this has led producers to
sacrifice writer’s experience level. After all, the average experience level of female writers is substantially
lower than that of male writers. In particular, 61 percent of the writer-project-level observations by male
writers are by those with zero credits, whereas this number is 76 percent for female writers; and the average
number of past credits is 0.40 for female writers and 0.96 for male writers (p-value = 0.000).
Columns 1 to 4 in panel (a) of Table 4 present DID regressions as specified in equation (1), except that the
dependent variables are measures of writer experience. Because a quarter of the writing teams have more than
one writer, we examine the mean, the maximum, the minimum, and the total number of past major writing
credits of the writers on a given project. The DID coefficients are all small and statistically insignificant.
These results suggest that, on average, associated producers do not appear to sacrifice writers’ experience as
they shift towards female writers. Column 5 shows that Weinstein-associated producers are also not using a
significantly larger writing team. Thus, associated producers appear to maintain the writers’ experience level
by replacing male writers with female writers with similar experience, rather than by expanding the size of
the writing team. This result also suggests that our main result of an increase in the likelihood of hiring
female writers is not driven by simply adding a “token woman.”
A related question is whether the increase in the demand for female writers is concentrated among expe-
rienced writers or if it also benefits novice writers. Panel (b) of Table 4 explores this question: the dependent
variables in Columns 1-3 are indicators of whether the writing team includes female writers with (i) three or
more credits (nine percent of the writer-project observations by female writers); (ii) one to two credits (14
percent); and (iii) zero past credits (77 percent). The results show that the increase is significant both for the
most-experienced female writers and for those with no major credits in the past ten years. In Columns 4 and
5, we increasingly relax the experience measure in order to capture the less-experienced ones among writers
examined in Column 3. In particular, Column 4 examines whether the project includes female writers with
no movie-writing credits (i.e., released by any company at any time before the focal project); and Column 5
examines whether the project includes female writers who, in addition to having no movie-writing credits,
also have not sold any scripts since 1998 (according to the DDP database). The results confirm that the
increased demand for female writers also benefits novice writers.
is non-associated all-male production teams).
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6.4 Impacts on the gender of non-writer roles
Finally, we examine whether the shock also affected the hiring of women in other roles. Columns 1-2 of Table
A5 examine the gender of directors using the 2,005 observations (about half of our sample) for which director
information is available at the time of the DDP record. Column 1 shows that relative to non-associated
producers, Weinstein-associated producers are also more likely to work on projects with the commitment of
a female director (p-value is 0.061). While the statistical significance is weaker than the conventional level,
the economic magnitude is large, as only 12 percent of projects had female directors in the pre-shock period.
Thus, 8.9 percentage points represent an increase of over 70 percent. Column 2 controls for the gender
of the writer; the estimated coefficient, though statistically insignificant (p-value is 0.111), is economically
non-trivial (representing a 37-percent increase). The smaller estimate reflects a positive correlation between
the gender of the writers and that of the directors (the correlation is 0.53).28 Overall, given that directors are
often deemed a more expensive role to fill and that directors tend to have substantial power over casting and
other creative decisions, these findings point to a broader and more significant change in the industry.
Columns 3-4 show that there are no differential changes by Weinstein association with respect to the share
of actresses among the early-committed talent who tend to be top-billed actresses. This result is not entirely
surprising given that casting is not yet complete at the time the project enters the database. Furthermore,
because all projects include actresses, their relative importance, such as the share of screen and speaking
time, is hard to gauge with the count data.
The final two columns show that Weinstein-associated production teams do not differentially change the
presence of female producers on their teams. This lack of change might be because the supply of female
producers with relevant experience is relatively more constrained, and entry barriers to becoming a producer
(e.g., connections to studios, agencies, talent, and other producers) are particularly challenging to overcome
quickly. Furthermore, producers tend to be either partners of a production company or executives of a movie
studio, which are long-run positions for which turnover is relatively costly.
6.5 Discussion
6.5.1 Limitations
Our paper has a few limitations. First, given that the median time to release is more than two years, we do not
observe the final outcome of these projects. However, historical data show that projects with female writers
are statistically similar to projects with all-male writers in terms of the probability of release and return on
investment conditional on the same budget level (see Table A6). In addition, we do not find any sacrifice of
28This positive correlation is consistent with our discussion in Section 4 that an increased demand for female directors may be
partly translated through demand for female writers, either because female writers tend to work on projects that are attractive to
other female talent or because they help signal and cultivate a female-friendly work environment.
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writing experience by associated producers after the shock. For these reasons, we do not expect the increase
in projects with female writers to lead to a lower rate of release, investment returns, or quality.
Second, we also lack data on payments to the writers and do not assess general-equilibrium effects (e.g.,
competition effect between associated and non-associated producers or potential impacts on the supply of
female writers). Our results on writer experience in Section 6.3 suggest an increased demand for female
writers among both the most-experienced writers and relatively novice ones. A more intense competition for
the most-experienced female writers is likely to bid up payments to this small subset of writers, for which
the supply is relatively inelastic, as experience is hard to accumulate quickly. For relatively inexperienced
female writers, however, the significant increase in demand may have a more muted impact on payments, as
the supply of these writers is likely to be more elastic.
Third, our paper raises the question of whether we would have seen similar changes to Weinstein-
associated producers if the scandal had not been accompanied by #MeToo. This question is difficult to
answer, as the Weinstein scandal, the movement, and the fact that both took place in the era of social media
are all intimately connected. Our conjecture is that the impact of the scandal would have been much more
muted in the absence of #MeToo for two reasons. First, there have been numerous historical examples of ha-
rassment in Hollywood and other industries, but they have rarely led to convictions or substantive changes.29
In contrast, Weinstein has been sentenced to 23 years in prison for criminal sexual acts and rape. Many
commentators suggest that #MeToo, amplified by social media, mobilizes a large number of victims to speak
out, which provides evidence that was “much larger than the sum of its parts.”30 Such collective power of
women’s voices is at the core of #MeToo and, in our view, fundamental to propelling changes on a broader
scale. In addition, the literature on scandal focuses on risk mitigation and reputation management as the
primary mechanisms for enacting change, which suggests that all-male production teams would be the most
responsive. The fact that we find female producers (both associated and non-associated) to be the primary
drivers of change suggests mechanisms beyond risk mitigation, which also suggests that we are unlikely to
observe changes of the same magnitude in the absence of #MeToo.31
6.5.2 External validity
Our study provides a framework for thinking about whether #MeToo will lead to similar changes in other
settings. As The New York Times reported, since the start of #MeToo, over 200 men in powerful positions
29The first known sex scandal in Hollywood, for example, dates back to 1921, when comedian Roscoe “Fatty” Arbuckle’s
sexual assault of actress Virginia Rappe led to her eventual death. Arbuckle was acquitted after three trials. Source:
https://apnews.com/dea7a81f65e64db5ac9de6f30943a803/Hollywood’s-long-ugly-history-with-sexual-harassment
30https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/us/harvey-weinstein-verdict-metoo.html.
31In addition, among producers that are not associated with Weinstein or any other producers subsequently accused of sexual
misconduct (that is, isolating the effect of being associated with any scandals), we also find that experienced production teams with
female producers are the only group that significantly increased their share of projects with female writers after #MeToo.
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have been fired for alleged sexual misconduct in various media and entertainment industries. These sectors
tend to draw significant media attention and are generally ideologically aligned with #MeToo’s call to em-
power women. They also exhibit collaboration networks similar to those in the movie industry, where central
figures have far-reaching industry networks. Thus, as in our setting, we may expect similar association ef-
fects through collaboration or social networks. While it is unclear how costly change is in these contexts, the
fact that 43% of the replacements for the fired individuals cited in the NYT article are women suggests that
the so-called “pipeline problem” may be less constraining than assumed. In contrast, #MeToo may have a
limited impact in geographies and sectors that do not typically attract media attention, in which stakeholders
tend to be ideologically opposed to the movement’s claims (Marquis et al., 2006; McDonnell and Cobb,
2019), or if changes are genuinely costly.
A setting that provides many parallels to our context is high-growth entrepreneurship. Not only is the
gender gap also notoriously large, but evidence also suggests that sexual harassment of female founders is
prevalent in this industry, which suggests that there is ample room for change.32 Two factors underlie our
conjecture that changes in this industry may not be as significant as those in the film industry, at least in the
near term. First, allegations of sexual harassment in this industry do not appear to be as highly publicized
as such allegations in other industries, perhaps due to the fact that many employees are required to sign
non-disclosure agreements. Second, to the extent that a sufficient presence of women in power positions is
critical for facilitating change after a scandal, such a presence is extremely scarce in VC firms.33
Our findings also provide perspective on the types of changes that we may expect from other scandals and
social movements and who may affect the change. While the specifics may vary by context, the magnitudes
of change should generally depend on the incentives to change and the associated costs. A particularly
interesting observation from our study is that the interaction between the scandal and #MeToo is important.
The Weinstein scandal not only brought heightened attention to harassment and sexual misconduct, but also
highlighted broader and deep-seated social and economic issues surrounding gender inequality. #MeToo, on
the other hand, is crucial for disseminating the scandal and for mobilizing the public to share their stories
and to support one another. When scandals uncover social and economic issues that resonate with a broad
set of stakeholders, they can: 1) extend the scope of changes beyond narrow fixes focused on the perpetrators
and problems directly related to the scandal; and 2) motivate people beyond those who are responsible for
the problem. Framed in this way, we may expect some scandals (e.g., academic paper retractions) to lead to
relatively narrow responses, while others (e.g., the killing of George Floyd and the subsequent Black Lives
Matter protests across the country and the world) may have the potential to instigate changes of a greater
32https://www.wired.com/story/its-way-too-early-to-talk-about-metoo-and-redemption/
33Gompers and Wang (2017b) show that less than ten percent of VC investors were female after 2010.
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magnitude by a broader set of individuals and organizations.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine whether the #MeToo movement, spurred by the Harvey Weinstein scandal, led to
changes in Hollywood producers’ likelihood of working with female writers on new movie projects. We find
that Weinstein-associated producers, relative to non-associated producers, are, on average, about 30-percent
more likely to work with female writers after the shock than before. Additional results suggest that the most
important mechanisms underlying the change seem to be that #MeToo and the scandal appeal to a group of
decision makers—female producers, in particular—who are sympathetic to the cause and face relatively low
costs of enacting change. There is also evidence suggesting that risk and/or guilt-mitigation are likely to be
important in explaining the response by production teams that are most intensely associated with Weinstein
and by less-experienced, all-male production teams. Overall, our study shows that in settings where large
gender gaps persist due to systemic market frictions and biases, a large and all-encompassing shock such as
#MeToo may engender positive and meaningful change.
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Figure 1: Whether producers work with female writers, by Weinstein association
(a) Raw data by quarter
(b) Time-specific DID coefficients
Note: Panel (a) is based on raw data and plots the likelihood of a project including any female writers for production teams with
versus without any Weinstein association for a given quarter. Panel (b) plots quarter-specific DID coefficients estimated from the
following equation: Yi = α+∑t δtWeinstein associationi× yt + γWeinstein associationi + yt +βXi + εi, with the same control
variables used in Column 2 of Table 2. The vertical line indicates the quarter before the reporting of the scandal and #MeToo.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
(a) Baseline sample
Weinstein association = 0 Weinstein association = 1
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD (p-value)
Include female writers 2380 0.26 0.44 1808 0.25 0.43 (0.41)
Post shock 2380 0.25 0.43 1808 0.27 0.44 (0.29)
Include female producers 2380 0.48 0.50 1808 0.53 0.50 (0.00)
Producer experience 2380 6.35 7.47 1808 11.90 9.31 (0.00)
Prior awards 2380 0.32 0.99 1808 1.23 2.07 (0.00)
Producer exp. w/ major studios 2380 0.50 0.43 1808 0.66 0.35 (0.00)
Producer exp. w/ top agencies 2380 0.55 0.39 1808 0.76 0.25 (0.00)
Producer team size 2380 2.79 1.70 1808 3.85 2.09 (0.00)
Writer experience 2380 0.80 1.54 1808 1.03 1.71 (0.00)
Writer team size 2380 1.27 0.50 1808 1.24 0.49 (0.08)
Top 4 agencies 2380 0.48 0.50 1808 0.60 0.49 (0.00)
Original 2380 0.65 0.48 1808 0.65 0.48 (0.92)
Complete script 2380 0.59 0.49 1808 0.56 0.50 (0.03)
Talent attached 2380 0.54 0.50 1808 0.59 0.49 (0.00)
Rights purchase 2380 0.17 0.38 1808 0.16 0.37 (0.40)
(b) Matched sample
Weinstein association = 0 Weinstein association = 1
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD (p-value)
Include female writers 1029 0.23 0.42 1029 0.24 0.43 (0.57)
Post shock 1029 0.23 0.42 1029 0.23 0.42 (1.00)
Include female producers 1029 0.51 0.50 1029 0.51 0.50 (1.00)
Producer experience 1029 9.54 8.03 1029 9.17 7.55 (0.28)
Prior awards 1029 0.41 1.00 1029 0.41 1.00 (1.00)
Producer exp. w/ major studios 1029 0.66 0.39 1029 0.66 0.36 (0.79)
Producer exp. w/ top agencies 1029 0.74 0.28 1029 0.74 0.28 (0.82)
Producer team size 1029 3.42 1.79 1029 3.50 1.76 (0.29)
Writer experience 1029 0.97 1.71 1029 0.92 1.65 (0.56)
Writer team size 1029 1.28 0.51 1029 1.24 0.48 (0.06)
Top four agencies 1029 0.57 0.50 1029 0.57 0.50 (0.82)
Original 1029 0.62 0.48 1029 0.65 0.48 (0.25)
Complete script 1029 0.57 0.50 1029 0.55 0.50 (0.51)
Talent attached 1029 0.52 0.50 1029 0.58 0.49 (0.01)
Rights purchase 1029 0.16 0.37 1029 0.16 0.37 (0.91)
Note: Panel (a) summarizes variables by Weinstein association for our baseline sample. The last column reports the p-values of
two-sample t-tests for equal means. Panel (b) summarizes the matched sample, which is generated based on the coarsened exact
matching method (Iacus et al., 2012). The matching is based on the characteristics of the production teams—Producer experience,
Prior awards, Producer exp. w/ major studios, Producer exp. w/ top agencies, Include female producers, and Producer team
size—and Post-shock. The p-values show that the two groups of projects are well-balanced along these characteristics and most of
the other variables. Top four agencies indicate that the writer is represented by one of the four largest talent agencies in Hollywood;
Original indicates that the script is based on original content rather than on existing properties such as books and short stories;
Talent attached indicates that some directing and/or acting talent was committed at the time of the record; and Rights purchase
indicates that the transaction is about adaptation rights, and the writers are the authors or creators of the pre-existing properties.
Other control variables include a set of dummy variables indicating 15 genres and 28 movie studios.
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Table 2: Weinstein-association effect on whether producers work with female writers
DV Whether have female writers
Sample Baseline sample Matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
W Association × Post Shock 0.079*** 0.089*** 0.124*** 0.102***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.035) (0.033)
W Association -0.035 -0.023 -0.017 -0.012
(0.025) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016)
W Association (low) × Post Shock 0.078*** 0.082**
(0.027) (0.037)
W Association (medium) × Post Shock 0.095** 0.126***
(0.035) (0.041)
W Association (high) × Post Shock 0.179*** 0.268***
(0.037) (0.046)
W Association (low) -0.009 -0.005
(0.018) (0.014)
W Association (medium) -0.042 -0.022
(0.035) (0.028)
W Association (high) -0.070* -0.171***
(0.037) (0.041)
Whether includes female producers 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.175*** 0.175***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.017)
Producer experience 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prior awards 0.004 0.004 0.017* 0.016*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Other controls N Y Y N Y Y
Genre FE N Y Y N Y Y
Studio FE N Y Y N Y Y
Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 4188 4188 4188 2058 2058 2058
R2 0.015 0.156 0.156 0.024 0.182 0.185
Note: OLS regressions. The dependent variable of all columns is whether the project includes at least one female writer. Columns
1-3 use the baseline sample, and Columns 4-6 use the matched sample. The matching is based on the characteristics of the
production teams—Producer experience, Prior awards, Producer exp. w/ major studios, Producer exp. w/ top agencies, Include
female producers, and Producer team size—and Post shock. W Association (low) = 1 if total number of past collaborations with
Weinstein is equal to one; W Association (medium) = 1 if total number of past collaborations with Weinstein is more than two but
less than or equal to six; and W Association (high) = 1 if total number of past collaborations with Weinstein is more than six. Other
controls include Producer experience with major studios; Producer experience with top agencies; Dummies indicating the number
of writers in the team; Producer team size; Top four agencies; Original; Complete script; Talent attached; and Rights purchase.
Standard errors clustered at the studio level (in parentheses). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Heterogeneity in the Weinstein-association effect
(a) By whether the production team has female producers
DV Whether have female writers
Sample Without female With female Female producer Female producer
producers producers experience > 14 proportion >
1
4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
W Association × Post Shock 0.057∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.045) (0.078) (0.054)
W Association -0.031 -0.012 -0.048 -0.023
(0.021) (0.034) (0.041) (0.034)
Other controls Y Y Y Y
Genre FE Y Y Y Y
Studio FE Y Y Y Y
Quarter FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 2076 2112 1147 1784
R2 0.133 0.159 0.199 0.172
E(DV|non-associated producers pre shock) 0.178 0.332 0.382 0.353
E(DV|non-associated producers post shock) 0.175 0.397 0.412 0.427
(b) By whether the production team has female producers and by producer experience
DV Whether have female writers
Sample Without female producers With female producers
Less-experienced More-experienced Less-experienced More-experienced
(1) (2) (3) (4)
W Association × Post Shock 0.081*** 0.050 0.303*** -0.055
(0.024) (0.063) (0.041) (0.084)
W association -0.063*** -0.019 -0.022 0.004
(0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.044)
Other controls Y Y Y Y
Genre FE Y Y Y Y
Studio FE Y Y Y Y
Quarter FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 1055 1021 1046 1066
R2 0.144 0.179 0.179 0.204
E(DV|non-associated producers pre shock) 0.182 0.171 0.366 0.273
E(DV|non-associated producers post shock) 0.180 0.163 0.363 0.478
Note: Split-sample OLS regressions. The dependent variable of all columns is whether the project includes at least one female
writer. In Panel (a), Column 1 uses all production teams with no female producers; Column 2 uses all production teams including
at least one female producer; Column 3 uses production teams for which the total experience of all female producers divided by the
total experience of all producers is greater than 1/4; and Column 4 uses production teams for which the proportion of female
producers is greater than 1/4. In Panel (b), more-experienced production teams are those for which the (maximum) experience of
producers in the team is greater than six (which is the median experience); and less-experienced teams are those for which the
(maximum) experience of the producers in the team is less than or equal to six. All regressions use the same set of controls as in
Column 2 of Table 2. Standard errors clustered at the studio level (in parentheses). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Weinstein-association effect on the experience of writers on a project
(a) Average experience, measured by major credits in past 10 years
DV Writer team experience defined as Num of
mean max min total writers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
W Association × Post Shock -0.014 -0.013 -0.021 0.009 0.011
(0.073) (0.058) (0.097) (0.084) (0.026)
W Association -0.010 0.009 -0.026 -0.075 -0.047*
(0.050) (0.046) (0.058) (0.062) (0.023)
All controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 4188 4188 4188 4188 4188
R2 0.164 0.169 0.162 0.185 0.057
(b) Distribution of experience
DV Include female writers with
≥3 1-2 zero zero past zero past credits
Major credits in past 10 years credits & zero past sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
W Association × Post Shock 0.019* -0.011 0.076*** 0.062*** 0.041***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013)
W Association -0.005 0.013** -0.029 -0.019 -0.022*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012)
All controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 4188 4188 4188 4188 4188
R2 0.048 0.047 0.132 0.129 0.142
Note: OLS regressions. In Columns 1-4 of Panel (a), the dependent variable is the experience of the writing team, which is
measured by the mean experience of all the writers on the team, the maximum, the minimum, and the total experience. For any
individual writer, we use our main measure of writer experience, which counts the number of writing credits that he/she obtained in
the previous ten years that are distributed theatrically by the top-30 distributors. The dependent variable of the last column is the
total number of writers on the team. In Columns 1-3 of Panel (b), we maintain the same experience measure for individual writers
as in Panel (a), and we use a dummy variable indicating whether the team includes female writers with more than three, one to two,
or zero major writing credits in the past ten years. In Column 4 of Panel (b), the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating
that the team includes female writers with zero past writing credits for movies released in any year before the focal project and by
any company; and Column 5 uses a dummy variable indicating that the team includes female writers who, in addition to having
zero past credits as measured in Column 4, have zero past sales recorded in the DDP database since 1998. All regressions use the
same set of controls as in Column 2 of Table 2, except for writer experience, as it is now the dependent variable. Standard errors
clustered at the studio level (in parentheses). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure A1: Google search interests
Note: Obtained from Google Trend for two keywords—Harvey Weinstein and Me Too Movement—in the United States. Numbers
represent search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A2: Summary statistics of producer-level samples
(a) All producers
Weinstein association = 0 Weinstein association = 1
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD (p-value)
Producer experience 4787 1.73 3.86 643 5.46 6.54 (0.00)
Prior awards 4787 0.07 0.41 643 0.37 0.98 (0.00)
Producer exp. w/ major studios 4787 0.18 0.34 643 0.36 0.38 (0.00)
Producer exp. w/ top agencies 4787 0.13 0.30 643 0.27 0.36 (0.00)
Female producer 4787 0.26 0.44 643 0.23 0.42 (0.05)
(b) Matched producers
Weinstein association = 0 Weinstein association = 1
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD (p-value)
Producer experience 608 5.40 7.76 608 5.01 5.73 (0.32)
Prior awards 608 0.25 0.90 608 0.31 0.85 (0.27)
Producer exp. w/ major studios 608 0.37 0.39 608 0.36 0.39 (0.82)
Producer exp. w/ top agencies 608 0.27 0.38 608 0.27 0.37 (0.94)
Female producer 608 0.24 0.43 608 0.23 0.42 (0.74)
Note: There are 5,430 unique producers in our sample. Panel (a) summarizes their characteristics by Weinstein association. The
person-level characteristics are defined based on their resumes before the Weinstein scandal. Panel (b) summarizes the matched
sample, where the matching is based on Producer experience, Prior awards, Producer exp. w/ major studios, and Producer exp. w/
top agencies. The t-tests show that the two groups of producers are well-balanced in their characteristics.
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Table A3: Weinstein-association effect: Robustness to individual producer fixed effects
DV Whether have female writers
Sample All Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4)
W Association × Post Shock 0.041** 0.042* 0.091*** 0.094***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.019) (0.024)
Writer experience -0.030*** -0.027***
(0.006) (0.006)
Producer experience 0.006*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.004)
Prior awards -0.006 0.031
(0.026) (0.031)
Producer exp. w/ top agencies -0.017 0.006
(0.019) (0.032)
Producer exp. w/ major studios 0.014 0.093
(0.026) (0.080)
Two-writer team 0.066** 0.058**
(0.029) (0.023)
Three-writer team 0.157*** 0.130**
(0.037) (0.049)
Four (and more)-writer team 0.094 0.047
(0.244) (0.286)
Total number of producers -0.006* -0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
Other controls N Y N Y
Studio FE N Y N Y
Quarter FE Y Y Y Y
Individual Producer FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 10199 10199 4262 4260
R2 0.333 0.382 0.277 0.336
Note: OLS regressions at the producer-project level, including individual producer fixed effects. Columns 1-2 use all producers in
our sample, and Columns 3-4 use matched producers based on their pre-shock characteristics—Producer experience, Prior awards,
Producer exp. w/ major studios, and Producer exp. w/ top agencies. Two-way clustered standard errors at the studio and the project
level (in parentheses). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A4: Weinstein-association effect on the quantity of projects
Sample All Matched
DV Projects Projects w/ Projects w/o Projects Projects w/ Projects w/o
female writers female writers female writers female writers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
W Association × Post Shock 0.024 0.079 0.003 0.223*** 0.411*** 0.148
(0.062) (0.113) (0.066) (0.085) (0.150) (0.093)
Producer experience 0.044*** 0.073*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.058*** 0.032**
(0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012)
Prior awards 0.166** 0.147 0.172** 0.202** 0.379*** 0.148*
(0.065) (0.102) (0.073) (0.081) (0.120) (0.088)
Producer exp. w/ major studios 0.654*** 0.537** 0.686*** 0.669*** 1.540*** 0.537**
(0.103) (0.244) (0.111) (0.257) (0.584) (0.247)
Producer exp. w/ top agencies 1.334*** 1.669*** 1.227*** 1.557*** 2.220*** 1.332***
(0.096) (0.201) (0.102) (0.189) (0.385) (0.191)
Producer FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 124867 45034 102557 27968 12535 24058
Note: Fixed-effects Poisson regressions using balanced panels at the producer-quarterly level. Columns 1-3 use all producers in our
sample, and Columns 4-6 use matched producers based on their pre-shock characteristics—Producer experience, Prior awards,
Producer exp. w/ major studios, and Producer exp. w/ top agencies. For the three columns for each sample, the dependent variables
are the number of projects, the number of projects that include at least one female writer, and the number of projects that include no
female writers set up by a given producer in a given quarter, respectively. We use the Quasi-ML method to compute robust standard
errors, which produces consistent estimates under relatively weak assumptions, allowing for overdispersion and a large mass point
at zero for the dependent variable. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Weinstein-association effect on the gender of other roles
DV Whether female director Share of actresses Female producers
whether any share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
W Association × Post Shock 0.089* 0.050 0.034 0.009 -0.020 0.006
(0.045) (0.030) (0.031) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020)
W Association -0.025 -0.012 -0.025 -0.027 -0.028 -0.035***
(0.029) (0.019) (0.031) (0.024) (0.017) (0.010)
Whether includes female writers 0.434*** 0.371***
(0.043) (0.031)
Whether includes female producers 0.139*** 0.064*** 0.182*** 0.124***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.016)
Two-writer team -0.014* -0.047*** -0.043* -0.074*** -0.016 -0.024***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008)
Three-writer team -0.012 -0.097*** -0.016 -0.110* -0.023 -0.027
(0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.056) (0.039) (0.020)
Four (or more)-writer team -0.093 -0.247 0.000 0.000 -0.120 -0.142***
(0.089) (0.186) (0.000) (0.000) (0.102) (0.022)
Total number of producers -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.027*** -0.021*** 0.091*** 0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Writer experience -0.013*** -0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.009** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Producer experience 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prior awards 0.003 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.024*** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Other controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Genre FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Studio FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2005 2005 1123 1123 4188 4188
R2 0.123 0.342 0.177 0.289 0.175 0.096
Note: OLS regressions. Columns 1-2 use observations for director information that is available at the time of the DDP record.
Because there is almost always a single director, we use a dummy variable indicating whether the director is female as the
dependent variable. Columns 3-4 use observations for which actor/actress information is available, and because there may be
multiple actors/actresses attached, we use the share of females as the dependent variable. Using an indicator of whether an actress
is included does not change the results. Columns 5 and 6 use all the observations, and the dependent variable indicates whether any
female producers are included and, if so, the share of female producers. Standard errors clustered at the studio level (in
parentheses). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A6: Release and performance: Historical data
(a) Likelihood of release
Release Release Release Release
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At least one female writer -0.001 0.011 0.010 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Major writer experience 0.047*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
At least one female producer 0.014 0.014
(0.009) (0.009)
Major producer experience 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Other controls N N Y Y
Genre FE N N Y Y
Year FE N N Y Y
Studio FE N N N Y
N 6415 6415 6270 6268
R-squared 0.000 0.025 0.072 0.080
(b) Box office performance and production budget
OLS regressions Quantile regressions
25th 50th 75th
log(Box Office) log(Budget) log(ROI) ROI ROI ROI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
At least one female writer -0.208* -0.268*** -0.033 -0.088 0.017 0.267
(0.106) (0.050) (0.142) (0.071) (0.123) (0.396)
At least one female producer -0.345* -0.107 0.086 0.006 0.054 -0.045
(0.197) (0.067) (0.099) (0.062) (0.085) (0.313)
log(Budget) -0.057 0.131*** 0.153*** -0.208
(0.083) (0.035) (0.035) (0.192)
Other controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Other investment controls N N Y Y Y Y
Release Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Studio FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 970 723 702 725 725 724
Note: Panel (a) shows OLS regressions using records from the Done Deal Pro database from 1998 to 2013 (that is, before the start
of our sample period). The dependent variable is whether the script is theatrically released. Other controls for panel (a) include Top
Agency; Complete script; Original; Talent Attached; and Genre dummies. Panel (b) uses movies that are released. Columns 2-6 in
this panel use released movies for which production budget information is available. ROI is defined as the ratio between worldwide
box office revenues and production budget. Other controls for panel (b) include whether a movie belongs to a franchise in addition
to all variables controlled for in panel (a). Other investment controls include star score (an index created by the DDP database
based on the total box office revenues of movies in which a given actor/actress performed); award-winning cast; the number of
screens during the opening weekend; and a seasonality index. Standard errors are clustered by studio. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Appendix B. a conceptual framework
In this appendix, we provide more-formal reasoning for our conceptual framework.34 A producer’s choice
of working with a given writer may reflect or correlate with many different reasons. For the purpose of our
paper, we categorize these reasons into two buckets: reasons related to harassment and gender discrimination
issues and those that are not.
Let bi be the net payoff from working on projects with a writer of gender i ∈ {Female, Male} due to con-
siderations that are not related to harassment and gender discrimination issues. This net payoff may capture
both economic cost-benefit considerations—such as the expected quality of the writer’s idea and his/her craft,
various cost factors, and his/her ability to attract other talent and investors—and intrinsic considerations such
as in-group preference.
Let pi be the probability of sexual harassment and gender discrimination issues that may arise at any time
during the development and production process of a project for which the writer’s gender is i. We assume
that the probability of harassment issues is lower for projects with female writers;35 that is,
Assumption 1. pF < pM.
Let H be the expected cost due to harassment and discrimination issues that stem from the focal project.36
One way to micro-found H is H = αL+ δC, where α is the probability that a given harassment issue will
be publicly exposed, and L is the expected cost given such exposure, including the monetary and time costs
associated with lawsuits, loss in revenue, and reputation damages. In addition, the producer may need
to incur harassment-related costs before any incident actually happens and is exposed. For example, the
producer may have to make extra efforts to persuade talent or investors to work with him or pay a premium
to compensate the risk they undertake, as talent and investors also face their own reputation and legal costs,
C, in case of harassment issues. Because pi is not perfectly observable, the market will respond according to
the perception of such risk. A reduced-form way to represent such a perception is piδ, where δ is equal to
one if the market has an unbiased perception, is greater than one if the market perceives a higher risk than
the actual level, and less than one otherwise.
A producer’s expected payoff from working with a writer of gender i can be written as:
bi− piH,
With this simple setup, producers will work on projects with female writers if
bF − pFH ≥ bM− pMH⇒ bF −bM− (pF − pM)H ≥ 0.
To translate the above decision rule to an empirical likelihood of working with female writers, we add a
34This model is adapted from the appendix model in Galasso and Luo (2019) [“Risk-Mitigating Technologies: the Case of
Radiation Diagnostic Devices,” September 2019, NBER Working Paper No. 26305.]
35As we discuss in the paper, research suggests that a greater presence of women tends to promote more respectful work envi-
ronments, where harassment is less likely to flourish and vulnerable parties are more comfortable reporting it (Dobbin and Kalev,
2017). Projects by female writers might be more attractive to other female talent; and the presence of female writers may also help
signal the producer’s commitment to creating better work culture and norms, thereby lowering the costs of recruiting other women.
36These costs will apply to the producer’s focal and future projects.
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random parameter ε∼ F to the right-hand side of the above equation. Thus,
P(work with female writers) = P(bF −bM− (pF − pM)H ≥ ε) = F(bF −bM +(pM− pF)H). (A1)
B.1. Impact of the Weinstein scandal and #MeToo
In the context of this model, the Weinstein scandal and #MeToo may affect a producer’s expected payoff by
(i) increasing H; and/or (ii) increasing bF .37
An increase in H captures the risk-mitigation incentive as discussed in Section 4 in the paper. As dis-
cussed, the likelihood of exposure of harassment issues (α) increases after #MeToo, both because public
scrutiny has increased and because the costs of sharing personal experience and reporting crime seem to
have decreased (Levy and Mattsson, 2019). Furthermore, various stakeholders may also be more likely to
penalize projects known to or perceived to have these abusive issues (that is, L is also likely to increase).
In addition, the scandal and #MeToo may also have increased the overall perception of the prevalence of
harassment issues (that is, δ will increase), and, for the same reasons discussed above for L, C will also likely
increase, as it reflects the expected costs associated with such issues borne by talent and investors.
An increase in bF may capture both an increase in the intrinsic motivations and a change in the eco-
nomic cost-benefit considerations due to a changing industry environment. As discussed in the paper, the
increased awareness and saliency of harassment and gender-inequality related issues may have triggered guilt
or sympathy in the producers. Regardless of the precise reasons, these events may increase the producer’s
preference for projects involving female talent; that is, the intrinsic components in bF become higher after
#MeToo. Similarly, the net payoff bF may also increase because the greater demand for projects with female
writers or with content that features strong women leads by studios and other talent after #MeToo makes it
easier to get them on board for projects by female writers relative to projects by male writers.
B.2. The association with Weinstein
As discussed in the paper, it is difficult to find a control group that has not been exposed to the #MeToo
movement. We use variation in the association with Weinstein to investigate the specific channel through
which the movement may spur change—via the association with Weinstein and the scandal. In particular, we
posit that both the increase in H and the increase in bF would be greater for Weinstein-associated producers
than for non-associated producers.
The greater increase in H for Weinstein-associated producers may arise for two reasons. First, as ex-
plained in the paper, associated producers received significantly greater scrutiny, implying a greater increase
in α for them. Second, the public and various stakeholders may infer that associated producers are more
likely to exhibit similar behaviors and/or a high tolerance for such behaviors than non-associated producers.
This suggests that the increase in δ is also greater for associated producers after #MeToo.
As discussed in the paper, the increase in bF may also be greater for Weinstein-associated producers
due to intrinsic motivations. People who have worked with Weinstein are more likely to be aware of his
37Note that for simplicity, we assume that the gender-specific probabilities of harassment incidences, pi’s, do not change, even
though they are likely to decrease after the shock. It seems more intuitive that such decrease, if any, will be greater for projects with
male writers than for projects with female writers. If so, this force alone, should lead to a decrease in the likelihood of projects with
female writers, which is against what we find in the paper.
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behavior and the widespread abusive culture or are even complicit in such behavior themselves, which all
likely to lead to a greater level of guilt. It is also possible that, without necessarily feeling more guilty,
past collaborations with Weinstein prompt them to pay more attention to these issues than non-associated
producers and, consequently, become more cognizant of and more sympathetic to the movement’s cause.
Under the premise that the increase in H and/or the increase in bF are greater for Weinstein-associated
producers than for non-associated producers, we have the following prediction:
Prediction 1. Relative to non-associated producers, associated producers have a greater likelihood of work-
ing with female writers after #MeToo than before.
Proof. The above result is straightforward. Take the derivative of equation (A1) with respect to H:
∂P(work with female writers)
∂H
= f (bF −bM +(pM− pF)H)(pM− pF),
which is positive under Assumption 1.
Similarly, take the derivative of equation (A1) with respect to bF , we get
∂P(work with female writers)
∂bF
= f (bF −bM +(pM− pF)H)> 0.
Thus, after #MeToo, we expect the likelihood of working with female writers to increase for Weinstein-
associated producers, and this increase could be driven by either an increase in H and/or an increase in
bF .
B.3. Heterogeneity in the Weinstein-association effect
Prediction 1 shows that, on average, #MeToo is likely to have a greater impact for Weinstein-associated
producers than for non-associated producers. But this differential change by Weinstein association may be
heterogeneous, because different producers may face different extents of increase in H and/or bF . In addition,
the level of bF may be different for different producers. For example, some producers face a lower cost of
identifying and recruiting female writers than others. Such a cost advantage may or may not be changed
by #MeToo. But even if it is not changed by #MeToo, it will affect the magnitude of change, holding the
increase in the incentives to change constant. Thus,
Prediction 2. The Weinstein-association effect is greater when the increase in H is greater or when the
increase in bF is greater. Moreover, when the proportion of female writers before #MeToo is lower than 50
percent, the W-association effect is also greater when the level of bF is higher (e.g., for producers facing a
lower cost of change), holding the increase in H (or bF ) constant.
Proof. The first two results in the above prediction follow directly from the result that ∂P(work with female writers)
∂H >
0 (under Assumption 1) and ∂P(work with female writers)
∂bF
> 0. The third result comes from the following two sec-
ond derivatives.
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First, take the second derivative of equation (A1) with respect to bF , we get
∂2P(work with female writers)
∂b2F
= f ′(bF −bM +(pM− pF)H)
The above expression may be positive or negative, depending on the sign of the derivative of the density
function f ′. For a symmetric density function (e.g., in the case of a normal distribution), f ′ > 0 for ε < 0
and f ′ < 0 for ε > 0. The gender gap in this industry is large before scandal; that is, the proportion of female
writers is lower than 50 percent. This suggests that (bF − bM +(pM − pF)H) is negative, which, in turn,
implies that f ′(·)> 0. Thus, ∂
2P(work with female writers)
∂b2F
> 0.
Second, take the cross-partial with respect to H and bF , we get
∂2P(work with female writers)
∂H∂bF
= f ′(bF −bM +(pM− pF)H)(pM− pF),
which is also positive because f ′ > 0 when the starting proportion of female writers is relatively small.
In Section 6.2, we explore potential heterogeneity in the Weinstein-association effect along a number of
dimensions, including the gender composition of the production team and producer experience. We interpret
these results by how these dimensions may reflect (i) variation in the increase in H; (ii) variation in the
increase in bF ; and (iii) variation in the overall level of bF .
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